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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 950166-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was there a legally sufficient factual basis for the 
lower Court's finding (a) that the Court had issued an order, 
rather than an informal, non-binding request, to the Salt Lake 
City Prosecutor, Ms. Cheryl Luke, to be in attendance at and be 
prepared to represent the City at the May 19, 1995 hearing, and 
(b) that Ms. Luke had violated such order? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: clearly erroneous. 
State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425, P.2d 773 
(Utah 1967). 
This issue was preserved in the Court's findings of fact 
numbered 4, 6 and 10 at Record, pp.97-99. The Court's findings 
were not apparent until they were signed by the Court on January 
9, 1995, nearly eight months after the hearing on the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and four months after the hearing on the City's 
Motion for Rehearing. Despite the Court's ruling against the 
City, the Commissioner ordered counsel for the City to prepare 
the findings, conclusions and judgment. The findings as drafted 
by the City's counsel were not objected to by Defendant's 
counsel. 
2. Was the Court's sanctioning of the Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor without notice and opportunity for hearing violative 
of due process? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error 
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at 
Record, p.100. 
3. Was dismissal of the City's Information eight months 
after the motion hearing was held inappropriate and beyond the 
power of the Circuit Court Commissioner? 
2 
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error 
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at 
Record, p.100. 
4. If the Court's request that Ms. Luke appear as the 
City's legal counsel at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing, was a 
formal order rather than an informal request, did that order and 
the subsequent case dismissal for its violation constitute a 
violation of separation of powers under the Utah Constitution in 
abuse of the Circuit Court Commissioner's discretion? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error 
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at 
Record, p.100. 
5. Was the Circuit Court's sanction inappropriate as 
prejudicing the public's interest in health, safety and welfare 
and as a ban on enforcement? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error 
3 
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at 
Record, p.100. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") 
of a dismissal by the Third Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, of a criminal Information filed by the City. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 19, 1994, a hearing was held before Commissioner 
Palacios of the Third Circuit Court on a motion to dismiss the 
Information filed against the Defendant. At the conclusion of 
that hearing, the Court issued a verbal decision dismissing the 
Information. Prior to the execution of any written findings or 
judgment the City filed Objections to Defendant's Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal as well as Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing and 
Supporting Points and Authorities. On September 1, 1994 a 
4 
hearing was held before Commissioner Palacios on the City's 
Motion for Rehearing. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Commissioner ruled, both orally and in her written 
findings, that the arguments set forth in the City's Motion for 
Rehearing were well taken and that the Court's verbal judgment of 
May 19, 1994 should be reversed. However, the Commissioner then 
ordered and adjudged that the City's Information should be 
dismissed, with prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake 
City Prosecutor for violating what the Court considered to be an 
order of April 18, 1994 for her to be in attendance and prepared 
at the May 19, 1994 hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 9, 1993, Salt Lake City filed a criminal 
Information against Defendant Dorman-Ligh in the Third Circuit 
Court charging her with violations of Salt Lake City's Housing 
Code and other ordinances. (Record, pp.1,2). 
2. At a pre-trial conference held April 18, 1994, the 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging violations of her 
federal and state constitutional rights. (Record, pp.17-25, 
5 
113). The Court Commissioner scheduled the date of May 19, 1995 
for the hearing on the motion, and she scheduled certain 
deadlines prior to that hearing for the filing of the City's 
responsive memorandum and for the Defendant's reply memorandum 
(Record, p.119). The Commissioner instructed the City's counsel, 
Mr. Todd Godfrey, an Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to 
request Ms. Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to appear 
at the motion hearing. (Record, pp.116,117). 
3. No responsive memorandum was filed by the City and 
therefore no reply memorandum was filed by the Defendant. 
4. At the motion hearing, Mr. Jeffrey Gray appeared as 
counsel for the City (Record, pp.207-211). He explained to the 
Court that Ms. Luke was unable to be present since she was in a 
meeting for the entire day. (Record, p.209). Mr. Gray stated 
that he was not familiar with the matter. The Commissioner 
stated that she considered Ms. Luke's failure to appear at the 
hearing and to argue the motion to be a violation of an order of 
the Court. (Record, pp.207-208). The Commissioner stated that 
the Court would like to speak to Ms. Luke later, at a convenient 
time, in that regard. (Record, p.208). 
5. The Commissioner determined that despite the City's not 
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being prepared, the hearing would go forward at that time. 
(Record, pp.208-209). Since Mr. Todd Godfrey was more familiar 
with the matter, it was decided that he would take Mr. Gray's 
place (Record, pp.209-211). The Commissioner then proceeded with 
the motion hearing with Mr. Godfrey representing Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Record, pp.211-233). 
6. After receiving various documents in evidence on behalf 
of the Defendant, proffers of testimony, and arguments of 
respective counsel, the Commissioner issued a verbal decision, in 
open court on May 19, 1994. That verbal ruling dismissed all 
counts of the City's Information on the basis that the City's 
building code enforcement mechanism was unconstitutionally 
selective. (Record, pp.230-233). The Commissioner did not state 
in her verbal order that the dismissal was with prejudice 
(Record, pp.230-233). 
7. No hearing or other proceeding was held with regard to 
the Commissioner's claim that Ms. Cheryl Luke had violated the 
Court's order. 
8. Prior to the execution of any written findings or 
judgment, the City filed its Objections to Defendant's Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal (Record, pp.31-46) as well as Plaintiff's Motion for 
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Rehearing and Supporting Points and Authorities with attached 
affidavits. (Record, pp.50-72). On September 1, 1994 a hearing 
was held before the Commissioner on the City's Motion for 
Rehearing. (Record, pp.158-194). 
9. On January 9, 1995, the Commissioner issued her findings 
that the arguments set forth in the City's Motion for Rehearing 
were well taken and that the Court's verbal judgment of May 19, 
1995 should be reversed. (Findings numbered 8 and 9 at Record, 
p.99). However, the Commissioner went on to find that the 
Information should be dismissed, with prejudice, as a sanction 
against the Salt Lake City Prosecutor for violating the Court's 
order to be in attendance at and prepared to represent the City 
at the May 19, 1994 hearing. (Finding numbered 10 at Record, 
p.99). The Court ordered and adjudged (in her written judgment 
dated February 15, 1995) that the Information be dismissed, with 
prejudice. (Record, p.106). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The finding of the lower Court that it had 
previously ordered Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 
personally to appear and to be prepared to argue the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and that Ms. Luke had violated that order, is 
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not supported by facts as set forth in the record. The facts do 
not show that at the April 18, 1994 pretrial conference the Court 
issued a sanctionable order to Ms. Luke, nor do they show that 
Ms. Luke received such an order and intentionally violated it. 
POINT II. If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present 
at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the subsequent 
dismissal of the City's Information was violative of due process. 
The sanction was for indirect contempt of court allegedly 
committed by the Salt Lake City Prosecutor. However, the 
sanctioned Salt Lake City Prosecutor was never given any notice 
prior to the administering of the sanction and was never given 
the opportunity for a hearing. 
POINT III. If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present 
at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the dismissal of 
the City's Information, with prejudice, eight months after the 
hearing was inappropriate and beyond the authority of the Court. 
The Court had already imposed sanctions upon the City by forcing 
the City to go forward with the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss 
despite the City's having filed no responsive memorandum to the 
Defendant's written motion and despite the prosecution's being 
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unprepared for the hearing. The Defendant was in no way 
prejudiced by the City's lack of preparation; in fact, the 
Defendant was advantaged by it. The Court could have imposed 
additional sanctions on Ms. Luke apart from this case pursuant to 
the Court's inherent contempt powers. However, it was totally 
inappropriate for the Court to allow the hearing to go forward, 
issue a verbal ruling of dismissal based upon the evidence and 
arguments presented, and then later reverse that ruling and 
instead dismiss the case, with prejudice, as a sanction for Ms. 
Luke's failure to appear at the hearing eight months earlier. 
POINT IV. If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present 
at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, that order and 
the subsequent dismissal of the Information, with prejudice, 
constituted a violation of the principle of separation of powers 
under Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, since the 
Court was usurping to power of the City, as the executive branch 
of government, to exercise its discretion as to the manner in 
which it chooses to prosecute its cases and which personnel it 
elects to employ to represent the City in a particular case at a 
particular time. 
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POINT V. If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present at 
the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the subsequent 
dismissal of the City's Information as a sanction prejudiced the 
public health, safety and welfare. The appropriate remedy was to 
punish the individual attorney rather than to punish the public. 
Further, the dismissal, with prejudice, effectively estopped the 
City from further enforcement of the housing code violations 
which had been charged. Such a ban contravenes the rule that 
government cannot be estopped except in unusual circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL 
BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING 
THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATED 
AN ORDER OF THE COURT 
A. No clear order was issued by the Court. 
At the April 18, 1994 pre-trial conference, the Commissioner 
requested Assistant City Prosecutor Todd Godfrey to ask Cheryl 
Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to appear at the hearing on 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court stated to Mr. 
Godfrey: 
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...perhaps what we ought to do in the future is if you 
would ask Ms. Luke to appear and make the Court aware 
of that. I likewise would have asked her to appear. 
In fact, let's do that, have Ms. Luke--I'll schedule a 
time and ask her if she will appear at that time both 
to argue this and to hear the matter, and I'll just 
give it a special setting. 
(Emphasis added). (Record, p.116) 
There is nothing in the Court's comments at the April 18, 
1994 pre-trial conference which clearly and unequivocally 
indicated that Ms. Luke was ordered to appear at the May 19, 1994 
motion hearing, and that she would be subject to sanctions for 
failing to appear. It is entirely reasonable that Ms. Luke, 
especially getting the message second-hand and not from the 
Commissioner personally, might have interpreted the request as 
just that, a non-binding request, with the discretion left to Ms. 
Luke to assign one of her assistant prosecutors to handle the 
motion hearing as she may deem necessary. 
B. The finding of violation of an order of the Court is not 
supported by the facts. 
In her Findings of Fact, the Commissioner found, inter alia. 
the following: 
10. However, this Court also finds that 
Plaintiff's Information should be dismissed, with 
prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor, for violating the Court's order to be in 
attendance at and be prepared to represent the 
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Plaintiff at the May 19, 1994 hearing in this matter. 
(Record, p.99) 
Nothing was ever entered on the Court docket sheet nor was 
there ever any written order issued by the Court that Ms. Luke 
appear at the motion hearing. There is nothing in the record and 
no finding by the Court that Ms. Cheryl Luke received any message 
that the Commissioner wanted her to appear at the motion hearing 
or that, if she did receive such a message, it was made clear to 
her that the request was anything more than an informal, non-
binding suggestion. 
The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's 
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive 
and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for 
decision. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure 2579 (1971). 
The Utah Supreme Court has said regarding review of findings 
of fact: 
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court 
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing 
court to find clear error, it must decide that the 
factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's determination. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
The finding of a violation of a Court order in the instant 
case, in the absence of a sufficient factual basis therefor, 
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constituted clear error on the lower Court's part and should be 
reversed. 
C. Marshalling of the Evidence. 
All of the evidence in support of the Court's Finding 
numbered 10 (Record, p.99) that the Court issued a sanctionable 
order at the April 18, 1994 pre-trial conference that Ms. Cheryl 
Luke be in attendance and prepared at the May 19, 1994 motion 
hearing and that Ms. Luke violated that order is found in the 
statements of the Court Commissioner at the April 18, 1994 pre-
trial. Record, pp.113-121. 
Observations or opinions of the Court at a later date are 
not relevant, since only an objective look at the statements 
actually made by the Court at the April 18, 1994 pre-trial and a 
determination as to whether a reasonable person would view those 
statements as constituting a sanctionable order are appropriate. 
The specific pertinent portions of the April 18, 1994 




THE COURT'S SANCTIONING OF THE 
SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR WITHOUT 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING 
WAg VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS 
As stated above, the Commissioner dismissed the City's 
criminal Information against Defendant as a sanction against 
Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor. (Finding of Fact 
#10; Record, pp.99,106). Although no formal criminal contempt 
proceedings were brought against Ms. Luke, the sanction was 
issued because of the alleged indirect contempt of Ms. Luke in 
failing to be in attendance at and prepared to represent the City 
at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing. (Finding of Fact #10; 
Record, p.99). 
The courts have distinguished direct contempt from indirect 
contempt, as follows: 
Summary or direct contempt is committed "in the 
immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at 
chambers. . . ." Utah Code Annotated 78-32-3 (1987); 
see e.g. West Valley City v. Borrego, 752 P.2d 361 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). Summary action is necessitated by 
the need to keep order in the court. Cooke v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed. 
767 (1925). 
Indirect contempt arises when some or all of the 
actor's conduct is outside of the court's view and 
presence. Ici. at 536. State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 
1228, 1229 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
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The Court went on to emphasize the increased due process 
requirements in the instance of indirect contempt: 
Because the court does not have immediate knowledge of 
all relevant and necessary facts in cases of indirect 
contempt, the charge is adjudicated after notice to the 
defendant and opportunity for a hearing. Sections 78-
32-4 and 78-32-9. In Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court articulated the due 
process requirements in indirect contempt cases, as 
follows: 
"Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not 
committed in the presence of the court, due 
process requires that the person charged be 
advised of the nature of the action against him, 
have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the 
right to confront witnesses, and have the right to 
offer testimony on his behalf. Id. at 1322." 
State v. Halverson. 754 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988) . 
See also, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Cooke v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Powers 
v. Taylor, 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963); Robinson v. City Court of 
Ogden. 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). 
In the instant case, there is no showing that Ms. Luke ever 
received notice of any possibility of any sanction against her, 
and no hearing was ever held in that regard. Fundamental 
fairness and the spirit of due process dictate that she should 
have been given an opportunity to receive notice and to respond 
to the allegation of indirect contempt against her before any 
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sanction was imposed -- including the sanction imposed here of 
dismissal of the City's case, with prejudice. 
POINT III. 
THE DISMISSAL OF THE CITY'S 
INFORMATION EIGHT MONTHS AFTER 
THE MOTION HEARING WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
AND BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONER 
On May 19, 1994, when the commissioner, in open court, 
called the case for the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, she expressed her displeasure that Assistant City 
Prosecutor, Jeffrey Gray, had appeared in behalf of the City 
rather than Ms. Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
(Record, pp.207-211). 
She stated that she had ordered Ms. Luke to appear because 
Ms. Luke was familiar with the case while Mr. Gray was not. 
(Record, pp.207,209). The Commissioner said: 
Now, with respect to Ms. Luke not being here, I'd 
like to talk to her and Mr. Godfrey. And, Mr. Gray, I 
will hope that you would get that information to them, 
and let me talk to them, and ask them to come up and 
see me at their earliest convenience. Because that was 
an order. And I'm not going to do anything until I 
talk to them (Record, p.208). 
Mr. Gray suggested to the Court that Mr. Todd Godfrey might 
have knowledge about the case and requested that he be given time 
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to consult with Mr. Godfrey. The Court agreed, but the Court 
made it clear that despite the prosecution's lack of preparation 
the motion hearing would go forward: 
MR. GRAY: He [Mr. Godfrey] is available at this 
point, but if he --
THE COURT: Would you like to talk to him a moment 
before we proceed? Because we are going to proceed. 
MR. GRAY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay, I'll give him a couple minutes to 
talk to Mr. Godfrey. We will proceed today. The 
City's had their opportunity to respond, hasn't done 
it, that's it. 
MR. GRAY: Okay. Well, if he knows anything it 
might help me so --
THE COURT: Mr. Gray, again I'm sorry to put you in 
this position, but I didn't do that. 
(Record, pp.209,210) 
A recess was then taken to allow Mr. Gray to locate and 
consult with Mr. Godfrey. When Court resumed, Mr. Godfrey was 
present and had taken over representation of the City from Mr. 
Gray. The hearing then went forward with introduction of 
evidence or proffers of evidence and arguments being made by both 
parties. (Record, pp.211-233.) 
At the time that the Commissioner realized Ms. Luke had 
failed to appear she could have postponed the hearing until a 
date when Ms. Luke could have been present. However, the Court 
determined that it was appropriate to go forward in Ms. Luke's 
absence, even though the City was unprepared. The going forward 
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of the case was itself a sanction against the prosecution. The 
City was forced to proceed without the Court having had the 
benefit of a responsive memorandum to the Defendant's written 
motion and without witnesses. 
Such a sanction was entirely appropriate, since it was the 
City's own error that it had failed to reply to the written 
motion and properly to prepare for the hearing. The City had 
notice of the date and time of the motion hearing and the Court 
was correct in going forward. Obviously the City was at a great 
disadvantage in attempting to argue the matter without proper 
preparation. Not only was the Defendant not prejudiced by the 
City's lack of preparation, but the Defendant was significantly 
advantaged by it. 
In addition to the sanction of forcing the City to go 
forward with the hearing, the Court stated, as noted above, that 
she wanted to talk to Ms. Luke at another time about Ms. Luke's 
violation of what the Court considered to be an order. In the 
event that such a separate hearing were conducted with Ms. Luke, 
additional and separate sanctions may have been imposed upon Ms. 
Luke. 
Despite the Defendant's great advantage at the motion 
hearing, she ultimately failed to persuade the Court that her 
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Motion to Dismiss should be granted, since the Court eventually 
reversed the verbal judgment of dismissal and found that the 
City's Motion for Rehearing should be granted. (Findings 
numbered 8,9 at Record, p.99). 
However, once the Court had insisted on going forward with 
the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and had rendered its ruling, 
it was inappropriate and an abuse of the Court's discretion to, 
eight months later, dismiss the Information, with prejudice, as 
an additional sanction against Ms. Luke. This was especially 
inappropriate in view of the Court's finding that the City's 
Motion for Rehearing should be granted. 
POINT IV. 
THE COMMISSIONER'S ORDER THAT 
THE SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR APPEAR 
AT THE MOTION HEARING AND THE LATER CASE 
DISMISSAL FOR HER FAILURE TO APPEAR WAS 
A VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
If the Commissioner's April 18, 1994, suggestion to 
Prosecutor Godfrey that he request Ms. Luke to be present and 
prepared to represent the City at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing 
constituted a binding order of the Court, it also constituted a 
violation of Article V, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution. 
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That Article reads: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly-
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise 
and functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. (Article V, Section 1, Utah Constitution) 
There is no constitutional or statutory grant of authority 
to the judicial branch of government to exercise the executive 
function of determining which prosecutor, in a multi-prosecutor 
office, shall represent a municipality in a particular case. 
Article V specifically prohibits a person charged with the 
exercise of judicial powers from exercising the functions of the 
executive unless expressly directed or permitted in the Utah 
Cpngtitutipn. See Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 
P.l, 45 L.R.A. 628 (Utah 1899). 
There is a significant difference between (1) the authority 
of the Court to secure obedience to its rules and process through 
its inherent contempt powers, and (2) the usurpation of the 
City's prerogative, acting through the head of its prosecuting 
arm, to decide which prosecutor will appear in a particular case 
on a particular date. Cities of the first class, as Salt Lake 
City is, have been given specific enabling authority by the 
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Legislature to appoint an attorney to represent the municipality 
(Section 10-3-902, Utah Code Annotated). By legislative 
enactment, the City Attorney has been granted authority to 
prosecute violations of city ordinances and "has the same powers 
in respect to the violations as are exercised by a county 
attorney or district attorney. ..." Section 10-3-928, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1954, as amended. 
The broad discretion given to prosecutors to determine 
whether and in what manner to prosecute, is a hallmark of 
constitutional separation of powers, and has been confirmed by 
the United States Supreme Court and by numerous lower Courts, 
including the Utah Supreme Court. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 2d 604 (1978), the United States 
Supreme Court said: 
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 
663, 668, 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, 611 (1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 3 90 (Utah 
1989) stated: 
The general rule is that prosecutors are given broad 
discretion in determining whether and in what manner to 
prosecute each case. Indeed, as long as the 
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prosecution has probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed, the decision regarding 
whether and in what manner to prosecute "generally 
rests entirely in [its] discretion." [citing 
Bordenkircher, supra]. Regarding such, this Court has 
heretofore stated: 
"It is not the function of the courts to review the 
exercise of executive discretion, and we cannot say 
that it was even for the prosecutor to treat the 
defendants in a different manner, and we cannot review 
the prosecutor's decision to proceed against one 
defendant under an information charging him with a 
felony and reducing the charge against the co-defendant 
to a misdemeanor." [Citing State v. Garcia. 504 P.2d 
1015 (Utah 1972).] 
* * * 
The rationale of these cases [cited therein] is 
persuasive. This jurisdiction has long recognized the 
vital role of the prosecution and the importance of 
affording that body discretion, within permissible 
limits, to exercise its function. Certainly, we are 
compelled, as are our sister states, to recognize this 
discretion as it preserves the constitutional concept 
of separation of powers. State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390, 
402, 403, 404, (Utah 1989). 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto sets forth the job description 
maintained by the Human Resources Division of Salt Lake City for 
the position of Salt Lake City Prosecutor. It will be noted that 
the duties of that position include overseeing "prosecution of 
cases, in all Courts including appeals to the district Court, on 
behalf of City, through supervision and assignment of Assistant 
City Prosecutors." (Emphasis added.) 
It was inappropriate and violative of the constitutional 
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principle of separation of powers for the Court to intrude into 
an area reserved exclusively to the discretion of the executive 
branch -- that is, to select which prosecutor to prosecute a 
particular case at a particular time. If the Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor's exercise of that discretion, in assigning an 
Assistant City Prosecutor to handle the motion hearing in the 
instant case rather than herself, resulted in the City being 
unprepared to go forward, the result is that the City's 
prosecution effort may suffer and the Motion to Dismiss may be 
granted. The appropriate sanctions for such may be 
administrative action by a supervisor or by the Mayor, but it is 
not the purview of the judiciary. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT'S SANCTION IS INAPPROPRIATE 
IN THAT IT PREJUDICES THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST 
IN HEALTH. SAFETY AND WELFARE AND ACTS 
AS A BAN ON ENFORCEMENT 
A. The dismissal of the City's Information, with prejudice, 
violates public policy. 
Inherent in the function of municipal governments is the 
protection of the public health, safety and welfare. The Utah 
Legislature has given power to all cities within the state to 
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...pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
conferred by this chapter [Chapter 8, Title 10, Utah 
Code Annotated!, and as are necessary and proper to 
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and its 
inhabitants.... Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated. 
See also Section 10-9-102, Utah Code Annotated. The specifically 
granted regulatory powers of cities include the power to regulate 
construction of buildings and removal of buildings and enclosures 
constructed or repaired in violation of any ordinance (Section 
10-8-52, Utah Code Annotated) and the power to declare what shall 
be a nuisance and to abate the same and impose fines upon persons 
who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist (Section 
10-8-60, Utah Code Annotated). 
The violations with which the Defendant was charged in the 
City's Information were violations of the City's Housing Code and 
related ordinances. Such ordinances are well within the powers 
granted Salt Lake City under state law. 
The Court's dismissal of the City's Information, with 
prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
prejudices the public's interest in health, safety and welfare by 
essentially legitimizing an allegedly illegal situation. Since 
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the Commissioner had already ruled that her previous verbal 
order dismissing the Information should be reversed, the 
appropriate remedy was not to punish the public but rather to use 
the contempt power available to the Court to punish the 
individual attorney involved. 
B. The Court's sanction acts as a ban on enforcement - in 
contravention of the rule that government cannot be 
estpppefl. 
By making the Information dismissal with prejudice, the 
Court effectively banned or estopped the City from further 
enforcement of the housing code violations which had been 
charged. Estoppel is inappropriate under the facts of this case. 
First, the basic elements of equitable estoppel are missing here. 
Those elements have been outlined by the Utah Supreme Court as 
follows: 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel has three factual 
predicates: "(1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such 
other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or 
act. Consolidated Coal Co., et.al. v. Utah Division of 
State Lands and Forestry, et.al., 886 P.2d 514, 522 
(Utah 1994) quoting Plateau Mining Co., et.al. v. Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 
(Utah 1990) and Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
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In the instant case there was no admission or act of the 
City upon which the Defendant relied resulting in injury to the 
Defendant. The Defendant had the advantaged at the motion 
hearing due to the prosecution's lack of preparedness. Yet the 
Court ultimately ruled that the Defendant had failed in her 
burden to prove that her motion should be granted. 
With regard to estoppel against the government, the 
Consolidated Coal ruling went on to state that the government may 
not be estopped except in unusual circumstances: 
These requirements are expanded when a party is 
attempting to estop the State or its agents. "The 
State may not be estopped unless injustice would result 
[if the State were not estopped] and there would be no 
substantial adverse effect on public policy." 
Consolidated Coal, supra. at 522 (quoting Plateau 
Mining, gupra at 728). 
See also Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
1982). See generally United States v. Kirkpfrtrigk, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 720, 735-37, 6 L.Ed. 199 (1824). 
In the instant case there would be no injustice done if the 
dismissal were reversed and the case were allowed to proceed to 
trial. The Defendant failed to prove at the motion hearing that 
the Information should be dismissed without a trial. There will 
be a substantial adverse effect on public policy if the dismissal 
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is allowed to stand. Justice and public policy demand that the 
case proceed to trial and that the City be allowed to attempt to 
enforce its ordinances for the general good. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court's dismissal of the City's criminal 
Information, with prejudice, was in error in several respects. 
There was an insufficient factual basis for the Court's finding 
that it had issued a sanctionable order that Ms. Cheryl Luke, the 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor, be present and prepared at the hearing 
on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and that Ms. Luke had 
knowingly violated such order. However, if it was a sanctionable 
order, it was violative of due process as being a sanction for 
indirect contempt of Court without affording the alleged 
contemnor notice or opportunity for hearing. 
Further, the order and the subsequent dismissal were beyond 
the powers of the Court Commissioner and an abuse of her 
discretion because (1) the City had already been sanctioned when 
the Court forced the prosecution to go forward with the hearing 
although they were unprepared to do so and (2) such an order was 
a usurpation of the City's executive function under the Utah 
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 
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Finally, the dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate 
since it prejudices the public's interest in health, safety and 
welfare and acts as a ban and an estoppel on governmental 
enforcement in contravention of the long-standing rule that 
government cannot be estopped unless injustice would otherwise 
result. 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the lower Court's 
dismissal, with prejudice, of the City's criminal Information 
against Defendant/Appellant should be reversed and the City 
should be allowed to go forward with a trial on the Information. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of June, 1995. 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Case No. 950166-CA 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
SS 
I, Connie Allen, being duly sworn and on my oath, hereby 
depose and say as follows: 
1. I am at present employed by Salt Lake City Corporation 
("City") in the position of Records Supervisor in the Division of 
Human Resource Management. 
2. My duties include acting as custodian of the City's 
records relating to job titles and job descriptions of the 
employees of the City. 
3. The attached document entitled "JOB TITLE: City 
Prosecutor" is a true and correct copy of the record in my 
custody which shows details pertaining to the position of City 
Prosecutor for the City, including a job summary and the typical 
duties of that position. This document and the duties described 
therein have remained janchanged since prior to April, 1994. 
DATED this g^/day of June, 1994. 
DNNIE ALLEN 
I hereby certify that on the^^^^/day of June, 1995, Connie 
Allen, personally known to me, did execute the above document, in 
my presence, being first duly sworn and on her oath. 
i 





My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
1SJW7 
NANCY T.TORRES 
461 South 8 u * & f c a i a 
Sift Uk» City, Utah S411t 
SUBJECT TO CHANGE 
WITHOUT NOTICE 
JOB TITLE: City Prosecutor 
JOB CODE: Q04220 EEO CODE: 2 PAY LEVEL 
005 - 1/92 
BARGAINING UNIT REPRESENTATIVE: Exempt FLSA: Exempt 
JOB SUMMARY: 
Under general administrative direction of City Attorney, oversees 
and directs activities of City Prosecutorfs Office, including 
arraignment and prosecution of persons violating ordinances of 
Salt Lake City. This is an administrative appointment. 
TYPICAL DUTIES: 
1. Oversees prosecution of cases, in all courts including ap-
peals to district court, on behalf of City, through su-
pervision and assignment of Assistant City Prosecutors. Ad-
vises on investigation used to determine if prosecution is 
warranted. Initiates as well as assists in negotiation of 
complaint settlements to save trial expense and expedite 
case termination. 
2. Tries principal criminal cases, prepares pleadings and 
briefs, makes oral arguments on behalf of City. Drafts, or 
has drafted, legal materials such as complaints, warrants, 
and subpoenas and sees that they are properly prepared and 
served. 
3. Consults and advises police department officials, City de-
partment heads and employees, and general public on matters 
concerning criminal law. 
4. Prepares operational budget for Prosecutor1s Office and sub-
mits to City Attorney for review and inclusion as part of 
Legal Department's annual budget. 
5. Recommends candidates for hiring and promotion; evaluates 
Assistant City Prosecutors and support staff; resolves per-
sonnel problems within Prosecutor's Office. 
6. Performs related duties as required. 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: 
1. Graduation from accredited college or university with JD or 
LLB Degree, and six (6) years' full-time employment in 
practice of law, including trial work. 
2. Membership in good standing w,vth Utah State Bar Association. 
3. Extensive knowledge of principles of criminal law, judicial 
procedures, and rules of evidence. 
4. Ability to direct and supervise a staff of assistant prose-
cutors and office support personnel. 
>. Ability to communicate effectively, orally and in writing. 
6. Ability to establish and maintain effective working rela-
tionships with elected officials, department heads, employ-
ees, officials and employees of other jurisdictions, and the 
general public. 
WORKING CONDITIONS: 
1. Comfortable working positions handling light weights. Inter-
mittent sitting, standing, and walking. 
2. Capacity to glean and rapidly assimilate facts; respond im-
promptu,, examine witnesses, and argue effectively, often 
under hostile and stressful circumstances. 
3. Capacity to organize and retain familiarity with large 
numbers of court cases of varying complexity and circum-
stances within short time periods. 
4. Capacity to acquire and retain current familiarity with ra-
pidly changing principles of law, and to apply principles to 
factual situations as presented in court. 
5. Capacity to function under repeated verbal distractions. 
The above statements are intended to describe the general nature 
and level of work being performed by persons assigned to this 
job. They are not intended to be an exhaustive list of all 
duties, responsibilities, and skills required of personnel so 
classified. 
APPROVED BY: DATE: 
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PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT: DATE: 
